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1 Introduction
The success of the natural sciences in predicting natural phenomena and advancing tech-
nological progress is commonly thought to go together with metaphysical naturalism in
a smooth way. In this thesis I will argue that, however common this idea may be, it is
seriously mistaken in an important respect: on naturalism, the remarkably effective usage
of mathematics in the natural sciences cannot be properly explained.
The natural sciences in general, and physics in particular, rely heavily on the employ-
ment of mathematical tools. Laws of nature, formulated in the language of mathematics,
are used to describe, explain and predict natural phenomena. The physicist Eugene
Wigner, in his article [23] from 1960, argued that the effectiveness of mathematics in this
regard is ’unreasonable’. The article unleashed an extensive debate circling around the
question how and to what extent the effectiveness of mathematics could be explained. In
this thesis I will partake in this debate by arguing that the effectiveness of mathematics
in the natural sciences cannot be adequately accounted for if naturalism is assumed. Fur-
thermore, I will attempt to show that, as a consequence, we have good reasons to think
naturalism is false.
First of all, I will present Wigner’s view of the ’unreasonable effectiveness of mathe-
matics’ and sketch the debate that followed his famous article (§ 2.1). Then I will intro-
duce some of the terminology I will be using, and make a few methodological remarks
(§ 2.2). After these preliminaries, in § 3, I will examine the effectiveness of mathematics
in detail, distinguishing between three different aspects of it. Then, in § 4, I will ar-
gue that naturalism is unable to adequately account for the effectiveness of mathematics.
Finally, after having discussed two promising non-naturalist explanations (§ 5.1), I will
conclude in § 5.2 that we have good reasons to reject naturalism. After all, the supposedly
lucky marriage between naturalism and the natural sciences will appear to be somewhat
disappointing.
3
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Wigner’s ’unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’
In 1959 the physicist Eugene Wigner gave a famous lecture in which he addressed what
he called ’the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences’. Based on
this lecture, his eponymous article [23] was published in 1960. Wigner’s central thesis is
that the way in which mathematics is used in the natural sciences to describe the physical
world is ’unreasonably’ effective, by which he means to say that
the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is something
bordering on the mysterious and that there is no rational explanation for it.1
I will now briefly discuss why he thinks this is the case, and then say a few words about
the debate unleashed by his article.
Wigner defines mathematics as ’the science of skillful operations with concepts and
rules invented just for this purpose’.2 Although many elementary mathematical concepts
are ’directly suggested by the actual world,’ he contends, ’the same does not seem to be
true of the more advanced concepts’.3 He repeatedly emphasizes that mathematicians do
not primarily develop mathematical concepts for their applicability in other fields, such
as the natural sciences, but for their aesthetic value and elegance:
Most more advanced mathematical concepts, such as complex numbers, al-
gebras, linear operators, Borel sets – and this list could be continued almost
indefinitely – were so devised that they are apt subjects on which the mathe-
matician can demonstrate his ingenuity and sense of formal beauty.4
In short, mathematical concepts, are chosen ’for their amenability to clever manipulations
and to striking, brilliant arguments’,5 according to Wigner.
He illustrates this by the way in which the concept of complex numbers is used by
mathematicians.6 Reality does not give rise to this concept in a direct way. When asked
to motivate the usage of complex numbers, a mathematician would point ’to the many
beautiful theorems in the theory of equations, of power series and of analytic functions
in general, which owe their origin to the introduction of complex numbers’7 – i.e. to
applications within mathematics itself.
Now, the surprising thing is, Wigner contends, that precisely these mathematical con-
cepts – selected for their mathematical beauty and elegance – turn out to be perfectly
suitable for describing the regularities of nature. There seems to be a mysterious corre-
spondence between beauty in mathematics and empirical adequacy of physical theories.
As an example, Wigner mentions the use of Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators by
John von Neumann for giving a mathematically rigorous expression of quantum mechan-
ics.8
For Wigner, another aspect of the mysteriousness of the effectiveness of mathematics
is that, in many cases, laws of nature, formulated on the basis of few and relatively
inaccurate observations, turn out to be capable of doing predictions with a surprisingly
high accuracy about a wide range of phenomena. He notices that
the mathematical formulation of the physicist’s often crude experience leads
in an uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate description of a large
class of phenomena.9
1[23, p. 2].
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4[23, p. 3].
5[23, p. 7].
6See [23, p. 3].
7Ibid.
8See [23, p. 7].
9[23, p. 8].
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To illustrate this, Wigner points out that Newton could only substantiate his law of uni-
versal gravitation with observations having a rather high inaccuracy of about 4%, whereas
today we know that it is in fact inaccurate to less than 0.0001%.10
At the end of his article Wigner draws a clear conclusion:
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the
formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither un-
derstand nor deserve.11
In short, he embraces the mystery and does not even attempt to provide an explanation.
Wigner’s article provoked many reactions from both physicists and philosophers: a
complicated debate was unleashed.12 As Russ notices in [18], two camps can be distin-
guished: those who, with Wigner, embrace the mystery (or even highlight new aspects
of it), and those who try to reduce the mysteriousness by attempting to provide explana-
tions for the effectiveness of mathematics. Besides Wigner himself, the mysteriousness-
embracing camp includes, among others, Hamming, Steiner and Livio.13 To the opposite
camp belong – to mention a few – French, Grattan-Guinness and Tegmark.14 It is safe to
say that, even today, the debate is far from reaching a consensus. I will make a contribu-
tion to it by arguing that embracing the mystery is inevitable if one assumes naturalism,15
and conclude from this that we have good reasons to reject naturalism.
2.2 Terminology and methodology
The aim of this thesis is to give an argument against naturalism by the effectiveness of
mathematics. This will run along the following lines. In § 3 I will examine the effec-
tiveness of mathematics by distinguishing between three different aspects of it. Then,
in § 4, I will argue that naturalism cannot adequately account for the effectiveness of
mathematics. Finally, in § 5, I will conclude from this that naturalism is implausible.
There are several controversies within the philosophy of science and the philosophy of
mathematics which have a bearing on our discussion. Particularly relevant are the debates
between realists and anti-realists, both in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy
of mathematics. My argument, however, will not depend on a specific position in these
debates.
Let us define the terminology we will be using. First of all, throughout this thesis I will
use the terms nature, world and universe interchangeably, all referring to the space-time
continuum of physical objects, which is typically studied by physics. The corresponding
adjective natural – for instance in natural phenomena – will denote something’s pertaining
to this space-time continuum.
I define mathematics to be the study of formal systems by means of deductive reason-
ing. By using this definition I employ a very general notion of mathematics without taking
a position in the debates within the philosophy of mathematics.16
By the effectiveness of mathematics (in the natural sciences) I refer to the fruitful way in
which mathematics is used in the natural sciences when it comes to describing, explain-
ing and predicting natural phenomena. This general formulation should, obviously, be
10See [23, p. 8]. Wigner also notices that this surprisingly high accuracy sometimes even applies to false
theories (see [23, pp. 12-13]). Newton’s law of universal gravitation would be an example of this, since it has
now been superseded by Einstein’s theory of general relativity.
11[23, p. 14].
12See [18], by Russ, for a concise overview of the debate. Omnès, in [15], discusses the debate in the broader
context of developments within the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, physics
and neuroscience.
13See [9] by Hamming, [19] by Steiner and [13] by Livio, the latter being aimed at a broader public.
14See [6] by French, [8] by Grattan-Guinness, and [21] and [22] by Tegmark.
15The term naturalism will be defined in § 2.2.
16Defining mathematics is notoriously difficult. Cf. [14] for some definitions commonly used by university
lecturers of mathematics.
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supplemented by some real content. Which aspects of the usage of mathematics are we
considering precisely? This will be made explicit in § 3.
Furthermore, I define naturalism as the view that, for every existing entity, its prop-
erties supervene on or are reducible to17 physical properties of entities in the external
and observer-independent reality of the spatio-temporal world.18 Loosely speaking, it
expresses the idea that everything that exists, somehow can be expressed in terms per-
taining to the domain of physics. For instance, a naturalist would say that, in principle,19
a full account of living organisms could be given in terms of elementary particles in our
space-time continuum ‘governed’ by physical laws. Typically, a naturalist will only allow
for natural causes of events; i.e. the universe is thought to be causally closed. Naturalism
does, however, leave room for emergence: the phenomenon that entities or processes have
properties which their constituent parts do not have. For instance, a naturalist might
say that, although a human being is constituted by atoms and atoms have no mental
properties, a human being does have mental properties.
For a (philosophical) theory T and some phenomenon P, I will say that T can adequately
account for or explain P if a coherent story, involving T, can be told which makes the
occurrence of P comprehensible.20 In particular, saying that naturalism cannot adequately
account for the effectiveness of mathematics amounts to the claim that no coherent story,
merely referring to observer-independent natural phenomena, can be told that makes us
understand how mathematics can be so effective.
Let us take some time to reflect on what explaining or accounting for is. Asking and
providing explanations for a certain phenomenon is commonplace both in everyday life
and in scientific practices. We want to know why something is the case, often implicitly
assuming that there must be some explanation for it. Explanations come in many dif-
ferent kinds, and it depends on the context what an adequate explanation should look
like. Sometimes a scientific explanation is expected: why is the boiling point of a liquid
dependent on the surrounding pressure? In other cases a personal explanation is most
appropriate: why have you come so early today? It also happens that the kind of expla-
nation required is unclear. Suppose we want to explain someone’s remarkable recovery
from an illness. Is there a natural (scientific) explanation available, or should we rather
look for a supernatural explanation? Obviously, in this case the explanatory resources
available dependent on someone’s background beliefs. This happens often. For instance,
for a theist, the world’s existence allows for a personal explanation – namely, that it was
created by God – whereas for a naturalist it does not.
In the case of the effectiveness of mathematics, it is far from clear what kinds of ex-
planation could or should be given. One can think of metaphysical, evolutionary, historical
or psychological explanations, for instance. Some of them will be compatible with natural-
ism, others not. Probably, an adequate account of the effectiveness of mathematics will
be a composition of several different kinds of explanations. Now, what I will be arguing
in § 4 is that naturalism lacks the explanatory resources for providing such an account;
i.e. one cannot come up with a coherent story that makes the effectiveness of mathematics
comprehensible and is compatible with naturalism.
17A set of properties A is said to supervene on a set of properties B if and only if two things can only differ in
their A-properties if they also differ in their B-properties. A set of properties A is said to be reducible to a set
of properties B if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between A and a subset of B which respects
the ’... is a property of ...’-relation.
18If our universe were part of a multiverse or ’world ensemble’, every term in this definition would only refer
to things in our universe. This means, in particular, that naturalism is compatible with the view that our universe
is part of a multiverse. Furthermore, notice that naturalism thus defined is incompatible with most forms of
idealism, including Kant’s transcendental idealism.
19Here the words ‘in principle’ are meant to express that, although human beings presently lack the ability
to give such a description, it would be possible for someone who was sufficiently intelligent and had sufficient
knowledge of the physical world.
20These are rather weak requirements in order for T to be able to adequately account for P. For instance, T
needs neither be a sufficient nor a necessary condition for P.
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One final remark should be made. In arguing against naturalism by its failure to ade-
quately account for the effectiveness of mathematics, I will not be employing an inference
to the best explanation. In an inference to the best explanation one considers several theo-
ries and examines which of them is most successful in explaining a certain body of data.
The success of theories is measured by several explanatory virtues, such as explanatory
power, explanatory scope, not being ad hoc and simplicity, and the ’winning’ theory is
considered to be the most viable. Roughly speaking, inferences to the best explanation
depend on two principles:
(1) A theory’s outrivalling alternative theories in explanatory virtues is a sign of
truth.
(2) A theory’s being outrivalled by alternative theories in explanatory virtues is a
sign of falsehood.
Arguably, principle (1) is considerably more controversial than principle (2), since falsifi-
cation of theories is much more straightforward than confirmation. The method I will be
employing has no need of principle (1), but only of the less controversial principle (2): I
will use principle (2) for drawing the conclusion that naturalism is implausible (see § 5).
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3 The effectiveness of mathematics examined
In this section I will investigate three different aspects of the effectiveness of mathematics
requiring an explanation, namely that
(i) nature is mathematically describable at all (§ 3.1);
(ii) nature and human beings are matched in such a way that nature is mathemati-
cally describable by human beings, even if (i) is taken for granted (§ 3.2);
(iii) the way mathematics is actually used in the natural sciences works so well, even
if (i) and (ii) are taken for granted (§ 3.3).
I will present these three types of effectiveness as a challenge to naturalism: this is what
requires an explanation. Eventually, in § 4.5, I will argue that naturalism is not able
to meet this challenge: it cannot even adequately account for one of the three types of
effectiveness.
One final remark should be made before the actual discussion of the three types of
effectiveness starts. The distinction between (i), (ii) and (iii) might not be very sharp,
depending on which philosophical positions one takes. However, this subtlety will not
affect the argument, since the distinction merely serves to make the presentation of the
different aspects of effectiveness as clear as possible. Nothing essential depends on the
distinction.
3.1 The world’s susceptibility to mathematical description
In this subsection I will discuss the fact that the world is mathematically describable at all.
Two necessary conditions for the world’s mathematical describability will be presented:
sufficient regularity (§ 3.1.1) and the mechanistic nature of this regularity (§ 3.1.2).
3.1.1 The orderly nature of the world
The world we live in is a profoundly orderly environment. The pen I left on my desk
yesterday night is still there when I wake up in the morning. I know that my bicycle
trip from home to the railway station will be the same distance today and tomorrow,
even though the weather conditions are rather different. I have never juggled four balls
in Canada (since I have never been there), but the fact that I am able to do so in the
Netherlands, makes it quite plausible that I have this ability in Canada as well.
The world’s mathematical describability somehow depends on its being ordered in
a ’nice’ way. One could ask: why is the world of such an orderly nature that it can be
described mathematically? However, this is not precisely the right question to ask, since,
arguably, any possible world can be described mathematically in some way.21 Imagine, for
instance, a chaotic world being a hodgepodge of wildly different events: sudden appear-
ances and disappearances of objects, mixed with light flashes and various sounds.22 Even
this world can be described mathematically. For instance, descriptions like the following
would be possible: ’At time t1 and location p1 there was a beeping sound for a duration of
d1 seconds’; or: ’x % of the light flashes at location p2 in time interval I were red-colored.’
However, these kinds of description merely amount to a form of bookkeeping. They do
not reveal any useful insights into the world, which allow for explanations or predictions
of events. This being said, a better question to ask is the following: why is the world of
such an orderly nature that it can be described mathematically in such a way that this
description provides real insight into the world by opening up the possibility to explain past
phenomena and predict future phenomena? When using the term mathematical describability I
will always mean this useful form of mathematical describability.
Now, in order to be mathematical describable, the world should behave in a suffi-
ciently regular way: it should not be the kind of chaotic world described above. Roughly
21Plantinga makes this point in [16, pp. 27-28].
22My description here is rather anthropocentric. However, this makes no difference for my point that even
chaotic worlds can be described mathematically in some way.
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speaking, this means that in similar circumstances, similar things must happen.23 An
important aspect of the world’s regular behavior is the universality of regularities. For
instance, they need to be invariant under change of time and place. Otherwise it would
be impossible to extrapolate experimental results to other times and places. In that case it
would neither be possible to formulate general laws of nature, nor to explain past events
and predict future events.
3.1.2 Teleological versus mechanistic order
What would a world look like that is not mathematically describable in a useful way?
The world could be of the chaotic kind as described in § 3.1.1. However, there are also
non-chaotic possible worlds which nevertheless lack the susceptibility to mathematical
description. Little creativity is required to imagine such a world, since history provides
us with a worldview which, if ’true’, would entail that the world we inhabit is of this
kind: the Aristotelian worldview predominant in the second half of the medieval period.
This gives us a second necessary condition for mathematical describability: the world’s
orderly nature should be of a mechanistic (instead of Aristotelian-teleological) fashion.
For people living after the Scientific Revolution it is difficult to imagine a way of
viewing the world not compatible with its mathematical describability. Therefore, it will
be helpful to sketch the Aristotelian view on this issue and see how it was gradually
replaced by a mechanistic worldview during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. I
will mostly draw upon [10] by Harrison.
In Aristotelian thinking, the order in the universe was attributed to the inherent prop-
erties of individual objects: how things behave can be explained by their individual na-
tures. This made for primarily teleological explanations of natural phenomena, which
employ the natural tendencies of the objects involved. A stone falls downwards when
dropped, because it strives for its natural place, which is the earth. Smoke, on the con-
trary, tends to go upwards, striving for its natural place away from the earth. As Harisson
notices, however, the order of nature, thought to be implanted by God,
did not manifest itself in absolutely invariant rules (...), because these im-
planted natural powers would on occasion miscarry, giving rise to exceptions
to the usual course of events.24
This means that the order of nature was thought to be of a kind that precludes adequate
mathematical description.
The Aristotelian framework involved a division of labor between natural philosophy,
concerned with causes of natural phenomena, and the mathematical sciences, such as optics
and navigation, concerned with human ’intervention’ in the world.25 A crucial distinc-
tion, closely connected to this, was that between natural and artificial. Natural philosophy
studied the natural world, whereas the mathematical sciences studied artificial human
constructions. Slightly exaggerating, the former took a realist stance (what is the world
really like?), the latter an instrumentalist stance (what is the best way to make tools for
practical purposes?). Accordingly, mathematical tools were only used in the mathemati-
cal sciences and not in natural philosophy: only the study of mechanical processes could
involve the use of mathematics; nature itself, however, viewed as an organism rather than
a mechanism, was not thought to be susceptible to mathematical description. At most one
23This poses a tough problem: what are the relevant similarities? It is related to Nelson Goodman’s ’new
riddle of induction’ (see his book [7]): what makes some predicates projectible (i.e. usable in lawlike general-
izations) and others not? In any case, in order for our world to be mathematically describable, there must be
some interpretation of ’similar’ according to which similar circumstances give rise to similar events. (Moreover,
in order for our world to be mathematically describable by human beings, humans should somehow be able to
distinguish between relevant and non-relevant similarities. Perhaps an adequate naturalist explanation of this
ability can be given, perhaps not. However, I will not go further into this issue.
24[10, p. 14].
25See [10, pp. 15-16].
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could ’save the appearances’ by means of mathematical constructions (as was done in
mathematical astronomy), but this was not aimed at uncovering the world’s real nature.
Harrison describes how in the late medieval period and the Renaissance the distinc-
tion between natural and artificial slowly disappeared. At the same time, the sharp
distinction between natural philosophy and the mathematical sciences faded away. This
new ’marriage’ between natural philosophy and the mathematical sciences opened up
the possibility to use mathematical tools for investigating how the world really is. To
thinkers during the Scientific Revolution, such as Galileo, Kepler and Newton, it seemed
quite plausible that the universe has a mathematical structure, since God, as the great
mathematician, had made it that way.26 Instead of an organism, the world became more
and more viewed as a machine, the behavior of which could be described by univer-
sal mathematically formulated natural laws. Accordingly, teleological explanations made
place for mechanistic explanations.
The world was no longer viewed as a rich variety of different substances, each having
their own qualities and properties. Instead, atomism became more and more influential,
which is the view that the world is built up of atoms, behaving according to a small
number of universal principles. As Harrison says:
Unlike the ontologically rich Aristotelian world, the sparse world of atoms
or corpuscles was unpopulated by the qualities, virtues, active principles,
and substantial forms that had once invested nature with significant causal
agency.27
It goes without saying that such a ’sparse world of atoms’ is far more suitable for mathe-
matical description than the ’rich Aristotelian world’.
In short, in order for the world to be mathematically describable, the connection be-
tween events should be essentially mechanistic instead of teleological; i.e. the universe is
not allowed to be the ’ontologically rich’ world of Aristotelian fashion. An important
aspect of this is the following: things in the world should behave according to a limited
number of general rules, instead of according to a plurality of individual ’strivings’ and
’qualities’. Of course there is room for teleological notions, for instance in biology or
archeology. Sometimes we are able to reduce them to mechanistic notions, sometimes we
are not. However, it is important to notice that only insofar teleological notions can be reduced
to mechanistic notions, an effective mathematical treatment of them is possible. The fruitful use
of mathematics in contemporary physics, for instance, goes hand in hand with the (near)
absence of teleological notions within this discipline.
3.2 Man’s ability to describe the world mathematically
Even if granted that nature is mathematically describable in principle – i.e. a sufficiently
intelligent being could provide an adequate mathematical description of it – the fact that it
is mathematically describable by human beings is remarkable. That is what this subsection
is about.
3.2.1 Nature’s complexity level fine-tuned for human investigation
Within mathematics education there is an enormous variation in difficulty levels. Adding
and subtracting natural numbers below 100 is quite a challenge for most six-year-olds,
but very easy for most ten-year-olds. Interesting stuff for beginning high school students,
such as solving quadratic equations, is way too difficult for most ten-year-olds, but quite
boring for most high school students near graduation. A mathematics graduate student
can, without the slightest effort, grasp every part of high school mathematics, while he
is largely incapable of understanding contemporary scholarly articles in mathematics.
Furthermore, we can easily imagine how hypothetical intelligent beings with greater
26See [10, pp. 19-26].
27[10, pp. 21-22].
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cognitive faculties than ours could develop mathematics so advanced that it is completely
beyond human grasp.
Now ponder the following question: mathematics of which difficulty level is required
for adequate description of nature? Plantinga, in [16, p. 28], points to the remarkable
phenomenon that the kind of mathematics fit for adequate description of nature is both
understandable and challenging for human beings:
it is accessible to us, but only at the limit of our abilities; to discover it has
required great effort on the part of many scientists and mathematicians.28
In other words, nature’s complexity level seems to be perfectly suited for human investi-
gation. Consider, for instance, the theory of general relativity and the theory of quantum
mechanics, both of them very fruitful, not only in theoretic value but also in practical ap-
plications. These two theories use advanced mathematical tools, such as tensor fields and
linear operators in Hilbert spaces – manageable but challenging for human investigators.
In order to appreciate the remarkableness of this ’fine-tuning’ of nature’s complexity
level, let us think for a while about what complexity level the world could have had (given
that it is mathematically describable in principle). On the one hand, the world might
have been describable by mathematics easy for human beings. For instance, Newtonian
physics might have been correct, or an even simpler system of physical laws. In this
case, physics would have been a ’completed’ science: the physical universe would be
completely understood, and no more progress would be possible. On the other hand,
the world’s regularities might have been of such a complex nature that the mathematics
needed to describe them would be too advanced to be grasped by human beings.29 This
could be the case in different ways. First, the structure of nature could have been too
complex conceptually (the kind of mathematics required would be too ’exotic’). Second,
even if nature’s structure were conceptually simple enough for human investigation, it
could have been practically unintelligible if physical quantities were dependent on too
many factors or on factors not detectable by humans. For instance, in the actual world,
according to Newtonian mechanics,30 the acceleration of an object is determined by the
net force acting on it and its mass. Now suppose that, in addition to this, the acceleration
were also dependent on the color of the object, the material it is made of, and the time
of the day. This would make the enterprise of physics practically impossible. It would
be even more problematic if the acceleration of an object were also dependent on some
factor not detectable for human beings.
As a matter of fact, nature’s complexity level seems to be perfectly suited to human
faculties: the mathematics required is not too easy and not too difficult. This matching
between human cognitive faculties and nature’s structure looks quite mysterious and
requires an explanation.
The following ’relativity objection’ could be made, however: nature’s structure can
be comprehended on many different levels, corresponding to different levels of advance-
ment in mathematics; the level on which nature is comprehended by humans in the actual
world, is just the one allowed for by the cognitive faculties we happen to have. Admit-
tedly, there is some leeway for variation in complexity level: if nature were somewhat
more complex, we would just understand slightly less of it, and if it were somewhat less
complex, we would understand slightly more of it.
However, the relativity objection has only limited force. On the one hand, we can
imagine ’too easily structured’ worlds, which could be fully comprehended by human
beings; on the other hand, we can imagine ’too complexly structured’ worlds, which
28[16, p. 28].
29An easily imaginable scenario is a world much like ours in which human beings are less intelligent. For
instance, if the smartest humans were as intelligent as an average person in the actual world, there would
probably be nothing like our contemporary physical theories.
30The fact that Newton’s theory has now been superseded by Einstein’s, makes no difference for the point I
want to make. The example could easily be adjusted to post-Einsteinian physics.
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cannot be comprehended at all by human beings. (Recall the enormous variation in
difficulty levels within mathematics mentioned above.) The fortunate fact that we neither
inhabit the former boring universe nor the latter unintelligible one remains remarkable.
Furthermore, in view of the wide range of natural phenomena which can be predicted
with great accuracy by contemporary physics, it can hardly be denied that we have a
substantial understanding of many parts of the physical world. Another reason for taking
this claim of substantial understanding of some aspects of the world seriously, is that
scientists also admit their lack of understanding of other aspects.31 In short, we have good
grounds for thinking that we comprehend the physical world quite well in an objective
sense. This objectification of our level of understanding of the world further restricts the
force of the relativity objection. Hence, the challenge to the naturalist remains: how
can the remarkable matching between human cognitive faculties and nature’s complexity
level be explained?
3.2.2 The cognitive faculties required for doing advanced mathematics
Imagine a group of twenty people varying in age between six and twenty-five, and a
pile of twenty study books varying in difficulty level from elementary school to academic
level. Suppose that, after choosing a random person and a random book, the book turns
out to have precisely the right difficulty level for this person: it is challenging to read
but understandable. There is a similar kind of remarkable matching, I argued in § 3.2.1,
between nature’s complexity level and human cognitive faculties. Now suppose that,
in addition to the foregoing, the book chosen was a study book for a first-year bachelor
course in linear algebra, and the elected person, happy to receive a book nicely adapted to
his capacities, a child of eleven years old. This would be all the more surprising: not only
is there a matching between the difficulty level of the book and the cognitive faculties
of the person, but also it is unlikely for this person to possess these cognitive faculties
anyway.
Plantinga, in [16, pp. 28-29], suggests that we are in a similar situation when it comes
to the cognitive faculties required for doing the kind of mathematics used in the con-
temporary natural sciences. Assuming naturalism, it is highly likely that our cognitive
faculties have come about by means of an unguided32 evolutionary process, merely se-
lecting for survivability and reproducibility. This would imply that either our cognitive
faculties required for doing complex mathematics are themselves conducive to survival
and reproduction, or they are the byproducts of something else conducive to these pur-
poses.
According to evolutionary theory, our cognitive faculties are not significantly differ-
ent from those of our ancestors living 10.000 years ago, who are supposed to have lived
together in small groups as primitive hunter-gatherers. They would have been primar-
ily concerned with hunting, gathering and preparing food, defending themselves against
several dangers and raising children. How could a Darwinian selection process have
provided such people with the ability to do advanced group theory, study infinite di-
mensional vector spaces and manipulate partial differential equations – not to mention
the more abstract stuff like set theory and category theory? In short, there is an explana-
tory problem to solve here for the naturalist.33
3.3 The fruitfulness of our anthropocentric way of using mathematics
Let us now turn to the remarkably fruitful way in which mathematics is used in the
contemporary natural sciences. In § 3.3.1 I will argue that there is a slightly mysteri-
ous correspondence between the ’anthropocentric’ notion of mathematical beauty and the
’objective’ notion of empirical adequacy, which is fruitfully exploited by scientists. Then,
31See, for instance, the special edition of Science from 2005, dedicated to the theme ’What Don’t We Know?’
(see [12]). No less than 125 open scientific questions are discussed there.
32Here ’unguided’ means that only natural causes are involved.
33See § 4.3 for the discussion of an attempt to give a Darwinian explanation.
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in § 3.3.2, I will discuss an especially interesting example of this, namely the usage of
Pythagorean and formalist analogies in contemporary physics.
3.3.1 Mathematical beauty and empirical adequacy
In § 2.1 we have seen how Wigner observed a correspondence between mathematical
beauty and utility: mathematical tools developed for their aesthetic value often turn out
to be surprisingly useful in their applications.34 This observation is done by many others
as well.35 The theoretical physicist and cosmologist Paul Davies, for instance, notices that
[i]n constructing their theories, physicists are frequently guided by arcane
concepts of elegance in the belief that the universe is intrinsically beautiful.
Time and again this artistic taste has proved a fruitful guiding principle and
led directly to new discoveries, even when it at first sight appears to contradict
the observational facts.36
He then quotes theoretical physicist Paul Dirac (who, interestingly enough, was married
to a sister of Eugene Wigner):
It is more important to have beauty in one’s equations than to have them fit
experiment (...) because the discrepancy may be due to minor features that
are not properly taken into account and that will get cleared up with further
developments of the theory. (...) It seems that if one is working from the point
of view of getting beauty in one’s equations, and if one has really a sound
insight, one is on a sure line of progress.37
In fact, Davies and Dirac seem to go a step further than Wigner by suggesting that pur-
suing mathematical beauty is a recommendable way of doing physics.
What precisely is mathematical beauty? There is no comprehensive and entirely clear
answer to this question, since it is primarily an intuitive concept. It somehow comprises
notions like elegance, simplicity and generality: the expression of much information by
few symbols, allowing mathematicians to prove powerful statements by relatively little
effort. Despite of its vagueness, the notion of mathematical beauty is almost universally
recognized by mathematicians and physicists.
Here is a way to test your own sense of mathematical beauty. In classical mechanics
the force F acting on an object is proportional to its acceleration a and its mass m; i.e. we
have F = ma. But why would the ’correct’ relation not have been given by F = ma1+10
−20
instead? There is no way to falsify this suggestion. I guess, however, that most people
find it ridiculous to even consider this option. Finding this ridiculous reveals two things:
first, having a sense of mathematical beauty, which prefers 1 over 1 + 10−20, and, second,
considering this sense of beauty to be a guide towards truth. In short, having a preference
for mathematical beauty is very human, just like the intuition that the universe ’obeys’
this preference.
Many mathematicians even view beauty as essential to mathematics; Godfrey Harold
Hardy, for instance, says:
The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s, must be beauti-
ful; the ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious
way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly
mathematics (...) It may be very hard to define mathematical beauty, but that
is just as true of beauty of any kind – we may not know quite what we mean
34As a baby example, recall how Newton’s elegant law of universal gravitation turned out to be 10.000 times
more accurate than Newton himself could verify (see § 2.1).
35See, for instance, [2, §17], [9, p. 87] and [19, p. 7, 64-66].
36[2, p. 220].
37Cited in [2, pp. 220-221].
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by a beautiful poem, but that does not prevent us from recognizing one when
we read it.38
Steiner, in [19, p. 63-66], gives a nice example which illustrates how beauty is constitu-
tive for mathematics. Why, he asks, are notions of chess, such as queening or castling,
not considered to have any mathematical significance? Surely, one can prove all kinds
of interesting ’chess theorems’ by them. What is the relevant difference between chess
theory and group theory that makes the latter mathematical and the former not? Well,
the best answer seems to rely on aesthetics: chess theory somehow lacks the simplicity
and generality group theory has.
Now, the surprising thing is that the anthropocentric39 notion of mathematical beauty,
which prefers group theory above chess theory, matches up with the physical world:
physicists ’encounter’ groups in many physical phenomena, whereas they do not ’en-
counter’ (or even expect to encounter) castling in the physical world. Accordingly, they
make abundant use of group theory, but no use of chess theory at all.
What makes the correspondence between mathematical beauty and empirical ade-
quacy weird, is that in almost all situations there is no positive correlation between
beauty and utility. The most beautiful swords are not the most effective for fighting,
and the most elegantly decorated chairs need not be the most comfortable for sitting. In
fact, in many cases there is even a negative correlation between beauty and utility: if a
tool is constructed to be optimally effective, we do not expect it to be optimally beautiful
as well. This makes the positive correlation between mathematical beauty and utility all
the more surprising. We do not usually regard human taste as a reliable guide for finding
out what the world is like: human preference for salty and sweet food does not show that
eating much salt and sugar is healthy, human superstitious inclinations do not indicate
that black cats can better be avoided, and – more closely connected to our topic of math-
ematical beauty – the joy people experience when playing chess does not suggest that
the structure of the game somehow reflects the structure of the universe. Why then think
that mathematical structures – selected by a taste for mathematical beauty – do reflect the
structure of the universe?
All in all, there is a surprising correspondence between two entirely different prop-
erties of mathematical concepts, namely the ’anthropocentric’ property of mathematical
beauty and the ’objective’ property of usefulness for describing the external world. What
makes this even more remarkable, is that the utility of mathematical concepts is not
restricted to medium-sized phenomena we are used to in everyday experience. Mathe-
matical tools are useful for describing phenomena on a microscale (quantum mechanics)
and macroscale (relativity theory) as well. Arguably, when it comes to understanding
the exotic worlds of the very small and the very large, mathematical beauty is even an
indispensable guide, as one can hardly rely on common sense and everyday intuition in
these fields. Indeed, contemporary theoretical physics depends strongly on the relation
between mathematical beauty and mathematical utility.40
3.3.2 The employment of mathematical analogies in physics
Analogical reasoning has always played an important role in the natural sciences. An
analogy is a correspondence between two domains of investigation A and B, having certain
structural similarities. Typically, one of the domains (say A) is better known than the
other (say B). In this case, a proved claim about A may give rise to hypothesizing the
38Cited in [19, p. 65], italics in the original.
39For Steiner, in [19], this word is a key term for expressing the ’mystery’ of the effectiveness of mathematics:
why would the use of mathematics, shaped by deeply anthropocentric concerns, be so effective in describing
the external world?
40What makes the correspondence between mathematical beauty and utility yet more perplexing, is that
mathematics can also be fruitfully used for analyzing arts, such as music, painting and architecture (cf. the
Journal of Mathematics and the Arts, which is an academic journal dedicated to investigating the relationship
between mathematics and art).
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corresponding claim about B. In this way analogies function as heuristic devices for
proposing new theories.
A delicate question concerning analogical reasoning is the following: precisely what
similarities between A and B may be hypothesized? In other words, what is the basis
for the analogy? Steiner, in [19], asks attention for mathematical analogies in physics;
i.e. analogies between two domains A and B of physics in which the similarities be-
tween A and B are found in the underlying mathematics. More specifically, he discusses
Pythagorean and formalist analogies, the abundant occurrence of which in physics would
be a threat to naturalism.41 In what follows, I will give Steiner’s definitions of these
terms and discuss some examples Steiner gives, in order to illustrate their pervasiveness
in modern physics.
Steiner defines a Pythagorean analogy at time t to be ’a mathematical analogy between
physical laws (or other descriptions) not paraphrasable at t into nonmathematical lan-
guage’, and a formalist analogy as a Pythagorean analogy ’based on the syntax or even
orthography of the language or notation of physical theories, rather than what (if any-
thing) it expresses’.42 The reason Steiner mentions formalist analogies as a specific kind
of Pythagorean analogies is that, according to him, ’from the "naturalist" standpoint,
formalist analogies are (or should be) particularly repugnant’.43 Steiner, in [19, §§4-6],
mentions and extensively describes various different Pythagorean and formalist analo-
gies in physics. I will mention a few of them, in order to give a taste of this kind of
analogical reasoning in physics.
An important Pythagorean (but not necessarily formalist) ’strategy’ employed by
physicists consists of the prediction of the real physical existence of entities corresponding
to solutions of certain mathematical equations.44 This works as follows: some function
f , representing a known physical reality, satisfies certain differential equations. However,
these equations are also satisfied by another function g, which is not known to corre-
spond to something physically real. Now, purely based on the mathematical analogy between
f and g (namely that they both satisfy the same differential equations), it is hypothesized
that g also has a real physical counterpart.
One example of this approach, mentioned by Steiner, is Maxwell’s prediction of elec-
tromagnetic radiation (ultimately confirmed by Hertz).45 Maxwell united the descrip-
tions of several electric and magnetic phenomena – first described separately by the laws
of Faraday, Coulomb and Ampère – into one mathematical model, given by what is now
called Maxwell’s equations. Important to note is that Maxwell did so not based on phys-
ical similarities known to him: the analogy between the different phenomena was purely
mathematical. This makes the analogy truly Pythagorean. The fruitfulness of Maxwell’s
Pythagorean approach is clear from the model’s successful prediction of electromagnetic
radiation.
Another example of this Pythagorean approach, given by Steiner, is Schrödinger’s
discovery of wave mechanics, by conjecturing that all solutions of the Schrödinger equa-
tion had physical meaning.46 Schrödinger started with an equation for monochromatic
light in a non-homogeneous medium. Then, after some mathematical manipulations, he
formulated the differential equation named after him; this equation was completely ab-
stracted from the original field of classical optics, and its solutions had no clear physical
meaning. Nevertheless, Schrödinger conjectured that all the solutions did have physical
41[19, p. 54]. Steiner takes naturalism to mean: ’opposition to anthropocentrism – the teaching that the human
race is in some way privileged, central to the scheme of things’ ([19, p. 55], italics in the original). Arguably, nat-
uralism, according to my definition (see § 2.2), entails the rejection of anthropocentrism thus defined. Hence, an
argument for anthropocentrism (according to Steiner’s definition) amounts to an argument against naturalism
(according to my definition). See also § 4.5.3.
42[19, p. 54], italics in the original.
43Ibid.
44See [19, pp. 76-84].
45See [19, pp. 77-79].
46[19, pp. 79-82].
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significance. As Steiner says, the ’equation serves as an "umbrella" for all its solutions’
and defines their being similar.47 Again, this makes the approach clearly Pythagorean.
An important class of formalist analogies, Steiner argues, is formed by a method
called quantization, which is used for ’building’ quantum mechanics.48 When employing
this method, physicists start with a formula giving a classical description of a certain
phenomenon (having only limited empirical adequacy), and then perform a number of
formal (i.e. purely syntactical) manipulations, hoping to end up with a quantum descrip-
tion (being much more empirically adequate).
An example of this quantization process is given by the development of matrix me-
chanics by Heisenberg, Born and Jordan.49 Their starting point was the classical law of
conservation of energy, which says that the total energy E of an object equals the sum
of its kinetic energy Ek (being a function of its momentum (p1, p2, p3)) and its potential
energy Ep (being a function of its position (x1, x2, x3)):
E = Ek(p1, p2, p3) + Ep(x1, x2, x3).
Now Heisenberg interpreted the position and momentum coordinates p1, p2, p3, x1, x2, x3
as Hermitian matrices P1, P2, P3, X1, X2, X3 and substituted them into the equation, thus
obtaining a matrix equation, where E is replaced by a diagonal matrix. It is important to
note that, although matrices have very deep mathematical properties, Heisenberg and his
fellow physicists were hardly aware of these properties, and just used matrices as handy
’bookkeeping devices’.50 I will not go into further details, but this should suffice to show
how Heisenberg’s approach involved a strong formalist component: it was based on a
syntactical analogy. Steiner discusses a number of other formalist analogies, showing
that they are pervasive in contemporary physics: ’it is the formalism itself (and not what
it means) that is the fundamental subject of physics today.’51
An important point to be made is the following: the fact that, in many cases, Pythagorean
and formalist procedures are rationalized at a later time, makes them no less surprising.
The remarkable thing is not the absence of a physical basis for an analogy, but the absence
of the knowledge of a physical basis when the analogy was fruitfully exploited.52
Now, what can we conclude from the usage of Pythagorean and formalist analogies in
physics? In § 3.3.1 we have seen how the development of mathematics has been (and still
is) essentially influenced by the deeply anthropocentric notion of mathematical beauty.
What ’counts’ as mathematics is determined by human preferences for elegance and sim-
plicity. The relation between mathematical beauty and empirical adequacy is nicely illus-
trated by the examples of Pythagorean and formalist analogies. Since these analogies ex-
ploit purely mathematical similarities (i.e. similarities not expressible in non-mathematical
terms) between physical theories, their employment is profoundly anthropocentric: it
rests upon similarities of particularly human interest.53 (This is especially impressive
when it comes to formalist analogies, since these are dependent on our parochial nota-
tional conventions, which have come about by a concatenation of seemingly insignificant
historical developments.) An explanation of the effectiveness of mathematics must ac-
count for the fruitfulness of such anthropocentric methods used in physics. This is yet
another challenge to naturalism.
47[19, p. 81].
48See [19, §6].
49See [19, pp. 146-156].
50See [19, p. 146].
51[19, p. 176].
52Cf. [19, pp. 74-75].
53Cf. [19, pp. 60-75].
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4 Naturalism incapable of providing an adequate explanation
In § 3 I have discussed three different aspects of the effectiveness of mathematics – ef-
fectiveness of types (i), (ii) and (iii) – and presented them as an explanatory challenge
to naturalism. I will now address four different naturalist responses to this problem, ar-
guing that they ultimately fail, and will finally attempt to show that naturalism fails in
general to adequately account for the effectiveness of mathematics.
First, some have argued that mathematics is not actually that effective at all (§ 4.1).
Second, there are authors who attempt to explain the effectiveness of mathematics by
the historical developments of mathematics and the natural sciences (§ 4.2). Third, it is
possible to propose a Darwinian explanation of the effectiveness of mathematics (§ 4.3).
Finally, some have proposed that the effectiveness of mathematics is explained by the fact
that the universe is itself a mathematical structure (§ 4.4). Responses of the first, second
and third kind often go together: it is argued, on the one hand, that mathematics is not
so effective as one might think, and, on the other hand, that the ’remaining’ effectiveness
can properly be explained by the evolutionary development of the human brain and the
history of science and mathematics. The fourth response typically stands on its own and
aims to provide a unique comprehensive explanation of the effectiveness of mathematics.
Having discussed these four different naturalist responses, I will argue, in § 4.5, that
naturalism is unable in general to adequately account for the effectiveness of mathematics,
since it lacks the explanatory resources for doing so.
4.1 Mathematics ineffective in many respects
Some authors have argued that mathematics is not so effective as one might be inclined
to think. For instance, Hamming, in [9, p. 89], points to the fact that the natural sciences –
by far the most frequent users of mathematical tools – can answer relatively few questions
we humans have:
From the earliest of times man must have pondered over what Truth, Beauty,
and Justice are. But so far as I can see science has contributed nothing to the
answers, nor does it seem to me that science will do much in the near future.
(...) When you consider how much science has not answered then you see that
our successes are not so impressive as they might otherwise appear.54
Where Hamming points to the ineffectiveness of mathematics in disciplines such as
metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics, Grattan-Guinness, in [8, pp. 13-15], argues that, in
many cases, mathematics is also ineffective in social, mental and life sciences, and some-
times even in physics.
In economics, for instance, mathematics is notoriously ineffective. As Grattan-Guinness
says, ’[t]here is a widespread practice of mathematicising the proposed theory whatever
its content (...) but much less concern for bringing it to test.’55 He quotes Velupillai, who
says that mathematics in economics is ’ineffective because the mathematical formalisa-
tions imply non-constructive and uncomputable structures’.56
Grattan-Guinness also gives examples from physics in which mathematics is not as
effective as one would wish. For instance, Poisson’s mathematical model of the cool-
ing of an annulus in a non-constant temperature was, though theoretically interesting,
practically unusable.57
A different kind of ’ineffectiveness’ Grattan-Guinness points to is the ability of math-
ematics to provide lots of information which is demonstrably useless. Consider, for in-
stance, ’astronomers sometimes calculating values of their variables to ridiculous num-
bers of decimal places, far beyond any scientific need of their time.’58 There are also
54[9, p. 89].
55[8, p. 14].
56Cited in [8, p. 14].
57[8, p. 14].
58[8, p. 13].
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vanities such as the generalisation racket, where a mathematician takes a the-
orem involving (say) the number −2 and generalises it to all negative even
integers −2n, where however the only case of any interest is given by n = 1.59
In short, mathematics seems to be ’unduly’ powerful.
The foregoing considerations show the importance of explicating what the effectiveness
of mathematics precisely consists of. Having done so, however, my response can be very
short: yes, mathematics is ineffective in many respects, but this objection does not at all
explain the effectiveness of types (i), (ii) and (iii), discussed in § 3.
4.2 Mathematics made to be effective
In this section I will present and respond to several proposed explanations of the ef-
fectiveness of mathematics involving the claim that mathematics is somehow made to be
effective by the way it is developed and used in the context of developments in the natural
sciences.
4.2.1 Hamming: nature’s mathematical structure as a human construct
Hamming, in [9, pp. 87-89], suggests the following (partial) explanation of the effective-
ness of mathematics:60 could it be that much of the world’s mathematical structure is put
into it by ourselves? He gives some examples which are supposed to show that in many
cases, ’the original phenomenon arises from the mathematical tools we use and not from
the real world’, and is, therefore, ’ready to strongly suggest that a lot of what we see
comes from the glasses we put on’.61
Let us look at two of Hamming’s examples. First, he describes how Galileo by the mere
use of thought experiment concluded that heavy objects do not fall faster than light ones.
Hamming concludes:
Galileo found his law not by experimenting but by simple, plain thinking, by
scholastic reasoning. I know that the textbooks often present the falling body
law as an experimental observation; I am claiming that it is a logical law, a
consequence of how we tend to think.62
Second, Hamming mentions the discovery that physical constants (seem to) satisfy Ben-
ford’s law.63 Many ’naturally occurring’ data sets satisfy this law, which says that the
probability that the first digit of the decimal representation of one of its members is d, for
d ∈ {1, . . . , 9}, equals log10(1 + 1/d).64 According to Hamming, ’[a] close examination of
this phenomenon shows that it is mainly an artifact of the way we use numbers’.65
What should we make of Hamming’s claim that much of the world’s mathematical
structure is of our own making? It is quite an ambitious suggestion, since it potentially
explains the types (i)-(iii) of effectiveness simultaneously. I will argue, however, that
Hamming’s considerations not only fail as an adequate explanation, but, on the contrary,
enhance the mysteriousness of effectiveness of type (iii).
In some cases claims about physical reality might indeed come about primarily by
’scholastic reasoning’ – arguably, the example of Galileo is one such case. In most cases,
however, the scientific enterprise consists of a complex interplay between empirical re-
search and deductive reasoning. More importantly, even if some claim about the physi-
cal world originates in ’scholastic reasoning’, one cannot simply conclude that the phe-
59[8, p. 15].
60This is one of Hamming’s four lines of explanation. He himself, however, does not consider them to be
sufficient for adequately explaining the effectiveness of mathematics (see [9, p. 90]).
61[9, p. 88].
62[9, pp. 87-88].
63See [9, p. 88]. The term Benford’s law itself is not used here.
64Cf. [1, p. 85].
65[9, p. 88].
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nomenon described is merely ’a consequence of how we tend to think’66 – at least if
we assume that the claim is (partly) concerned with observer-independent features of
reality.67
Claims may be proposed based on ’scholastic reasoning’, but they also have to be ex-
perimentally verified before acceptance in the scientific community. Cases in which such
’scholasticly’ produced claims are indeed experimentally confirmed, rather add to the
mystery of the effectiveness of mathematics than explain it. Surprisingly, Hamming’s
discussion of the present issue contains a nice example of this:
When examining [Einstein’s] special theory of relativity paper (...) one has the
feeling that one is dealing with a scholastic philosopher’s approach. He knew
in advance what the theory should look like, and he explored the theories
with mathematical tools, not actual experiments. He was so confident of the
rightness of the relativity theories that, when experiments were done to check
them, he was not much interested in the outcomes, saying that they had to
come out that way or else the experiments were wrong. And many people
believe that the two relativity theories rest more on philosophical grounds
than on actual experiments.68
As a matter of fact, the theory of general relativity has been very well corroborated by
experimental evidence. But why would Einstein’s ’scholastic’ approach be so successful
by producing a theory of high empirical adequacy? This might well be another instance
of the mysterious effectiveness of type (iii), discussed in § 3.3.
In short, since the products of ’scholastic reasoning’ have to match up with experi-
mental data (and this matching is a non-trivial one, since we assume that the objects of
our experiments and their behavior have a substantial observer-independent component),
the effectiveness of mathematics cannot be adequately explained by saying that the math-
ematical structure of this world is largely of our own making. In fact, the more fruitful
the use of this ’scholastic reasoning’ is in the natural sciences, the more mysterious the
effectiveness of type (iii) appears to be.
4.2.2 French: the Partial Structures Programme
French, in [6], argues that the effectiveness of mathematics might be clarified by means of
the so-called Partial Structures Programme. This programme aims to provide a description
of the relation between mathematics and science, and to explicate how the former is used
by the latter. I will first briefly sketch this approach,69 and then argue that it ultimately
fails to adequately account for the effectiveness of mathematics.
The starting point for the Partial Structures Programme is the idea that a physical
theory T – already formulated in mathematical terms – is embedded in a mathematical
structure M′; i.e. there exists an isomorphism between T and a substructure M ⊆ M′.
In this situation M′ provides some ’surplus’ mathematical structure, which may give rise
to an ’extended’ physical theory T′, isomorphic to M′.70 In order to accommodate the
openness of theories to new development in the presence of other theories, M is repre-
sented as a partial structure:71 it is taken to be a family of ordered pairs M = 〈A, Ri〉i∈I ,
where A is a non-empty set and Ri, for i ∈ I, is an ni-place partial relation on A;
66For instance, the phenomenon that physical constants satisfy Benford’s law cannot be dismissed as ’an arti-
fact of the way we use numbers’. Berger and Hill, in [1, p. 90], write: ’Although many facets of [Benford’s law]
now rest on solid ground, there is currently no unified approach that simultaneously explains its appearance
in dynamical systems, number theory, statistics, and real-world data. In that sense, most experts seem to agree
(...) that the ubiquity of [Benford’s law], especially in real-life data, remains mysterious.’
67In the context of my argument I can safely make this assumption, since I only consider naturalist interpre-
tations of Hamming’s suggestion (so in particular not a transcendental idealist interpretation).
68[9, p. 88].
69Cf. [6, §2]. See [5] for a more extensive discussion of the Partial Structures Programme.
70See [5, pp. 188-189].
71See [5, p. 190].
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i.e. we have Ri = 〈Ri,1, Ri,2, Ri,3〉, where Ri,1, Ri,2, Ri,3 are mutually disjoint sets satis-
fying Ri,1 ∪ Ri,2 ∪ Ri,3 = Ani . The elements of A constitute the domain of knowledge
under consideration. For i ∈ I, the set Ri,1 can be interpreted as the ni-tuples belonging
to the relation Ri, the set Ri,2 as those not belonging to Ri, and the set Ri,3 as those of
which it is not defined whether they belong to Ri.
The way in which two theories T and T′ relate to each other can be described by a
partial isomorphism72 between their corresponding partial structures M = 〈A, Ri〉i∈I and
M′ = 〈A′, R′i〉i∈I ; i.e. a bijection f : A→ A′ which satisfies
(x1, . . . , xni ) ∈ Ri,j ↔ ( f (x1), . . . , f (xni )) ∈ R′i,j, for i ∈ I, j ∈ {1, 2}, (x1, . . . , xni ) ∈ Ani .
This captures the notion that T and T′ share some parts of their structures; namely, Ri,1
corresponds to R′i,1, and Ri,2 corresponds to R
′
i,2, for i ∈ I.
In order to express the relation between a physical theory and a mathematical struc-
ture, it is also considered helpful to introduce the notion of a partial homomorphism,73
which differs from a partial isomorphism in that the function f is allowed to be merely
an injection (instead of a bijection), and that the requirements of equivalence are replaced
by requirements of implication. A partial homomorphism f : T → M′ between a physical
theory T and a mathematical theory M′ expresses how part of the structure of T corre-
sponds to part of the structure of M′. In this situation, T might be supplemented with
some extra structure imported from M′ via f .
Now, French’s suggestion in [6] is that, by using the tools of the Partial Structures
Programme, the cooperation between mathematics and science can be described in such
a way that the effectiveness of mathematics is clarified.74 Let us grant, for the sake of
argument, that the Partial Structures Programme indeed provides the tools for adequately
describing the relation between mathematics and science. To what extent then, is this
approach able to account for the effectiveness of mathematics? First of all, it can only
be used for explaining effectiveness of type (iii), since it is meant to account for the
fruitfulness of specific heuristic methods used by scientists; effectiveness of types (i) and
(ii) is simply assumed here.
This being said, is the Partial Structures Programme able to adequately account for
effectiveness of type (iii)? Probably, this approach helps to better understand the effective-
ness of mathematics in many instances of mathematical application in science. However, I
claim that it cannot help us in properly accounting for the fruitful application of Steiner’s
Pythagorean and formalist analogies (see § 3.3.2). The employment of such analogies
amounts to the import of some mathematical ’surplus’ into physical theory, which has no
known physical basis. The usage of this kind of analogies may be nicely described in the
terminology of partial structures, but in doing so its effectiveness remains unexplained.
Even if the ’surplus’ part of a mathematical structure has itself been developed for de-
scribing other physical phenomena, the effectiveness of the analogy is still in need of an
explanation, as long as the mathematical analogy has no known physical basis – which is by
definition the case for Pythagorean and formalist analogies. Hence, the Partial Structures
Programme does not seem to help in explaining the effectiveness of Pythagorean and
formalist analogies.
More generally, the Partial Structures Programme does not help in explaining the re-
markable correspondence between mathematical beauty and utility, described in § 3.3.1.
In which mathematical structure M′ can some physical theory T best be embedded? Pre-
cisely what mathematical ’surplus’ should be added to T? Which partial homomorphisms
72See [5, p. 191].
73See [6, pp. 106-107].
74For instance, French uses the terminology of partial structures for analyzing the usage of group theory in
quantum mechanics. When it comes to the construction of isospin, he says: ’Here the effectiveness of mathemat-
ics surely does not seem quite so unreasonable, as group theory is brought to bear via a series of approximations
and idealisations (...). In effect, the physics is manipulated in order to allow it to enter into a relationship with
the appropriate mathematics, where what is appropriate depends on the underlying analogy’ ([6, p. 114]).
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should be exploited? For answering these questions, the slippery notion of mathematical
beauty plays an important – and, as I have argued, mysterious – role. All in all, the
Partial Structures Programme works well for describing, but less well for explaining the
effectiveness of mathematics.
4.2.3 Grattan-Guinness: the intimately connected developments of mathematics and physics
Grattan-Guinness, in [8], not only argues that mathematics is sometimes rather ineffective,
as we have seen in § 4.1, but also that the remaining effectiveness is quite reasonable:
It emerges that the connections between mathematics and the natural sciences
are, and always have been, rationally although fallibly forged links, not a
collection of mysterious parallelisms.75
In the spirit of French76 (cf. § 4.2.2) Grattan-Guinness emphasizes the importance of
input from the natural sciences in mathematics for the development of mathematical
theory: ’Much mathematics, at all levels, was brought into being by worldly demands,
so that its frequent effectiveness there is not so surprising.’77 He illustrates this point by
sketching four different ways in which scientists develop new theories in the presence of
existing ones: reduction, emulation, corroboration and importation.78
Furthermore, Grattan-Guinness lists a number of ’significant topics, notions, and
strategies that help in theory-building to produce some sort of convoluted theory out
of previous theories’,79 including notions from mathematics, such as linearity, convexity
and partitioning, and from the natural sciences, such as space, energy and causality.80 It
often happens that the same notion appears in different contexts; this makes the use of
analogies possible. Now, since there are lots of different mathematical and physical no-
tions, many different analogies can be tried out, until a suitable one is found.81 This,
Grattan-Guinness argues, contributes to an explanation of the effectiveness of mathemat-
ics: mathematicians develop ’theories in specific contexts using various ubiquitous topics
and notions, which physicists then [find] also to be effective elsewhere.’82
Furthermore, Grattan-Guinness argues, in many cases the effectiveness of mathemat-
ics in physical theories is enhanced by a process called desimplification: factors which
were formerly ignored as ’perturbations’, are included into newer models. This means
that later models are more complex, but also more accurate than their predecessors.
In short, Grattan-Guinness thinks that the effectiveness of mathematics can largely be
explained by the simultaneous developments of mathematics and the natural sciences, an im-
portant role being played by the use of analogies made possible by the ubiquity of mathemat-
ical notions, and effectiveness-enhancing desimplifications. Opposing Wigner, he concludes
that ’beauty and (...) the manipulability of expressions (...) cannot ground mathematics or
explain its genesis, growth, or importance.’83
The response to Grattan-Guinness’s attempt to explain the effectiveness of mathe-
matics can largely be the same as the one we gave in § 4.2.2 in the case of French: ef-
fectiveness of types (i) and (ii) is not explained at all, and effectiveness of type (iii) is
only partly explained. Indeed, the simultaneous developments of mathematics and the
natural sciences cannot properly explain the effectiveness of Pythagorean and formalist
analogies. Furthermore, in light of § 3.3.1, we must conclude that Grattan-Guinness too
75[8, p. 7].
76See [8, p. 8], where Grattan-Guinness says: ’In general terms I follow the spirit of French (...).’
77Ibid.
78See [8, p. 9].
79Ibid.
80See [8, p. 10].
81Hamming, in [9, p. 89], makes a similar point when saying that ’we select the mathematics to fit the
situation, and it is simply not true that the same mathematics works every place.’
82[8, p. 10], italics in the original. A number of examples are given in [8, pp. 10-13].
83[8, p. 15], italics in the original.
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easily downplays the importance of the notion of mathematical beauty in the development
and use of mathematics.
On top of this, Grattan-Guinness’s approach seems to be insufficient on a deeper level.
Namely, even if the development of mathematics were largely determined by ’worldly
demands’,84 the mystery of the effectiveness of mathematics would not be solved but only
displaced. The original problem – how can mathematics, being developed for its own sake,
be so successfully applied in the natural sciences? – would be replaced by a new one –
how is it that such a coherent and elegant mathematical system can be constructed from
empirical input? Omnès, in [15, p. 1734], calls this ’a displacement [of Wigner’s question]
toward mathematics itself’.
All in all, Grattan-Guinness’s attempt to account for the effectiveness of mathematics
is insufficient for several reasons.
4.3 Mathematical cognitive faculties brought about by a Darwinian process
Evolutionary accounts form yet another class of potential explanations for the effective-
ness of mathematics.85 Such an account amounts to a story about how human cognitive
faculties required for effectively using mathematics could have come about by Darwinian
processes, which select for survival and reproduction.86
Obviously, effectiveness of type (i) lies beyond the explanatory scope of evolutionary
accounts. This is largely true for effectiveness of type (iii) as well, although one might
consider explaining the correspondence between mathematical beauty and utility by a
Darwinian account. However, as I have tried to show in § 3.3.1, this is highly problem-
atic. Therefore, an evolutionary explanation can at most contribute to accounting for
effectiveness of type (ii). I have already argued in § 3.2.2 that this is quite a challenge for
the naturalist. Nevertheless, some have taken up the challenge and have tried to provide
an evolutionary explanation of human mathematical abilities. An example of such an
attempt is the article [3] by De Cruz. It will be enlightening to discuss this article at some
length in order to assess the value of this kind of attempts.
De Cruz starts her discussion with distinguishing between ’top-down’ and ’bottom-
up’ approaches to explaining human mental faculties.87 Whereas top-down approaches,
such as (neo)-Platonist and theist ones, try to explain complexity by referring to ’higher’
entities or faculties, bottom-up approaches, such as Darwinian ones, try to explain com-
plex phenomena by simpler phenomena. The bottom-up approach is to be preferred,
according to De Cruz, since ’it is refutable, more parsimonious, and has a greater ex-
planatory power than the top-down approach’.88 This, for her, motivates the search for a
Darwinian explanation of human mathematical abilities.
After discussing some examples of animal mathematical cognition, such as numerical
and geometrical competence and algorithmic behavior,89, she argues that a so-called mod-
ular approach to human cognitive faculties might help to explain mathematical abilities.90
The term module was used by Fodor in [4] to denote a brain function specialized to pro-
cess external input in a certain specific way. De Cruz contends that there exists something
like a number module, which can ’rapidly perceive and count small collections of objects
(subitizing), and it can make rough estimations of larger quantities’.91 Then she goes
84Cf. Grattan-Guinness’s statement in [8, p. 8] quoted above.
85See, for instance, [9, p. 89], where evolutionary explanations are considered ultimately inadequate, and [3],
where more is expected of such an approach.
86I take selecting for survival and reproduction to be determinative for the meaning of Darwinian. (So, I use
the term Darwinian in a fairly broad sense. For instance, according to my definition, the modern synthesis
in biology – sometimes called neo-Darwinism – also employs Darwinian mechanisms.) I will not consider
explanations based on evolution by non-Darwinian mechanisms.
87See [3, §1].
88[3, p. 159].
89See [3, §2].
90See [3, §3].
91[3, p. 177].
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on to discuss mathematical abilities humans share with animals and, subsequently, those
unique to human kind.92 Concerning the latter category, she takes some time to discuss
’complex geometric skills’,93 such as ’mental rotation and mental imaging of geometric
shapes’94 – the development of which would have been stimulated by stone tool-making
abilities – and ’complex and accurate numerical competence’,95 including the ability to
count and do simple arithmetic. Until this point only very elementary mathematics has
been discussed. More or less satisfying evolutionary explanations hereof seem to be avail-
able. But what about explaining more advanced mathematical skills? She turns to this
question at the very end of her article,96 but the answer is disappointing. After suggest-
ing that a modular approach could shed some light on this issue, she concludes that the
’evolution of human mathematical abilities is still little understood.’97
De Cruz’s article nicely illustrates that, although one can give Darwinian explana-
tions of elementary mathematical faculties, such as spatial and numerical awareness, this
is hardly a beginning of a Darwinian explanation of the more advanced mathematical
faculties. Her statement that ’[e]volutionary theory provides a strong deductive frame-
work for explaining human (...) cognitive capacities’,98 rather than a conclusion, seems
to be just a presupposition motivating her inquiry. The upshot of this is that, even if the
naturalist is determined to give an adequate Darwinian explanation of human mathe-
matical abilities, actually doing so is very tough: the difference in advancement between
elementary mathematical skills (which, arguably, are conducive to survival and reproduc-
tion) and sophisticated mathematical skills (which are clearly not conducive to survival
and reproduction) is simply too big. Probably, the naturalist cannot give a satisfactory
evolutionary explanation of effectiveness of type (ii).
4.4 The world as a mathematical structure
Up to now all alleged explanations have assumed that the spatio-temporal world and
the domain of mathematics are, though somehow intimately connected, distinct entities.
Some authors, however, argue that the world is itself mathematical. An important repre-
sentative of this view is Tegmark in [21] and [22]. I will now present his view and discuss
how it is supposed to explain the effectiveness of mathematics. Then I will argue that it
ultimately fails in doing so.
4.4.1 Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis
Consider the following two hypotheses put forward by Tegmark in [22]:
External Reality Hypothesis (ERH): There exists an external physical reality com-
pletely independent of us humans.
Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH): Our external physical reality is a
mathematical structure.99
He defines a mathematical structure as ’abstract entities with relations between them’.100
Tegmark explicates MUH as follows:
Whereas the customary terminology in physics textbooks is that the external
reality is described by mathematics, the MUH states that it is mathematics (more
specifically, a mathematical structure).101
92See [3, §4].
93See [3, §4.4].
94[3, p. 183].
95See [3, §4.5].
96See [3, §4.6].
97[3, p. 191].
98[3, p. 178].
99[22, p. 102].
100[22, p. 104]. See [22, Appendix A] for a more technical discussion of what a mathematical structure is.
101[22, p. 107], italics in the original.
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He makes no distinction here between ’is’, ’corresponds to’ and ’is isomorphic to’, since
’if two structures are isomorphic, then there is no meaningful sense in which they are not
one and the same’.102
Tegmark argues that ERH entails MUH.103 Obviously, this would imply that, if one
considers ERH to be plausible, one must find MUH plausible as well. Besides this,
Tegmark goes on to argue, there are two additional reasons for thinking MUH is true.
First, it would explain the effectiveness of mathematics:
[MUH] explains the utility of mathematics for describing the physical world
as a natural consequence of the fact that the latter is a mathematical structure,
and we are simply uncovering this bit by bit. The various approximations that
constitute our current physics theories are successful because simple math-
ematical structures can provide good approximations of certain aspects of
more complex mathematical structures. In other words, our successful the-
ories are not mathematics approximating physics, but mathematics approxi-
mating mathematics.104
The second reason Tegmark gives, related to the first one, is that MUH would explain how
it is possible ’that further mathematical regularities remain to be uncovered in nature.’105
I will neither discuss the plausibility of ERH itself nor of the claim that it entails MUH.
Instead, I will argue that, if MUH were true, MUH would not be able to adequately
account for effectiveness of type (ii), if naturalism is assumed (§ 4.4.2).106 Furthermore,
I will argue that, independently of ERH, MUH has some severe problems rendering it
implausible (§ 4.4.3).107
4.4.2 MUH’s failure to account for effectiveness of type (ii)
As the passage quoted above suggests, arguably, many aspects of the effectiveness of
mathematics can be explained by MUH. For instance, effectiveness of type (i) can prob-
ably be reasonably well accounted for by MUH. Furthermore, if effectiveness of type (ii)
is taken for granted, then effectiveness of type (iii) might also be explained quite well
by MUH: the correspondence between mathematical beauty and empirical adequacy,
together with the fruitful employment of purely mathematical analogies in physics, is
considerably less surprising if literally everything were mathematics.
But what about effectiveness of type (ii)? Here seems to be a problem for MUH, when
naturalism is assumed: if the entire physical world were a mathematical structure, and
human investigators were somehow part of this structure, why should we expect them to
have the appropriate cognitive faculties for investigating the world?108
In particular, why are nature’s regularities simple enough for human investigation?
Why do we inhabit a world in which physical quantities are invariant under almost all
thinkable factors? Tegmark formulates this problem by asking why the world structure
we are part of has so many symmetries,109 and responds as follows:
102Ibid.
103See [22, pp. 102-107]. His reasons for thinking so need not bother us here.
104[22, p. 107], italics in the original.
105Ibid.
106I.e. MUH can only adequately account for the effectiveness of mathematics when naturalism is rejected. An
example of a scenario in which MUH is true and naturalism is false, is one in which God has made the world
as a mathematical structure.
107If one accepts both Tegmark’s argument that ERH entails MUH and my argument that MUH is implausible,
then one is forced to conclude that ERH is implausible. In that case, since naturalism entails ERH, one must
consider naturalism implausible as well. This would reinforce my conclusion in § 5 that naturalism is probably
false.
108Perhaps a solution could be that God has made the world as a mathematical structure with human beings
as substructures in it, in such a way that these substructures can fruitfully ’investigate’ the entire structure.
However, this is no option if one assumes naturalism.
109See [22, §4.1]. Formally, symmetries of the world structure S, as Tegmark interprets them, are automorphisms
on S; i.e. permutations of S that preserve all relations (see [22, §3.1]). (It should be specified, of course, what the
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It is arguably not surprising considering that symmetry (...) appears to be
more the rule than the exception in mathematical structures. However, an
anthropic selection effect may be at play as well: as pointed out by Wigner,
the existence of observers able to spot regularities in the world around them
probably requires symmetries (...). For example, imagine trying to make sense
of a world where the outcome of experiments depended on the spatial and
temporal location of the experiment.110
However, I regard this response as insufficient. First, it is not clear what the statement
about symmetry being ’more the rule than the exception’ is supposed to mean. In fact,
symmetry groups of various mathematical structures have all kinds of magnitudes; say-
ing that they tend to be large would seem to be false in any meaningful sense. Second,
appealing to an ’anthropic selection effect’ is unconvincing: the existence of conscious
beings in a largely unintelligible environment seems perfectly possible (cf. § 3.1.2 and
§ 3.2.1). It would be very difficult indeed to make sense of a world in which outcomes
of experiments were dependent on the spatial and temporal location of the experiment –
but this is precisely the problem: why do we not inhabit such an unintelligible world? In
short, when assuming MUH and naturalism, the big size of the symmetry group of our
world structure would remain largely mysterious.
Tegmark also suggests that the relative simplicity of nature’s regularities might be a
consequence of the truth of the following hypothesis:111
Computable Universe Hypothesis (CUH): The mathematical structure that is our
external physical reality is defined by computable functions.112
He explains: ’By this we mean that the relations (functions) that define the mathematical
structure (...) can all be implemented as computations that are guaranteed to halt after a
finite number of steps.’113 So, can CUH help in explaining effectiveness of type (ii)? This
is questionable, since CUH is beset by problems, as Tegmark himself points out in [22,
§7.7]. First of all, why would mathematical structures defined by computable functions
have a privileged status? Positing that our world is such a structure seems to be rather ad
hoc. Furthermore, ’virtually all historically successful theories of physics violate the CUH,
and (...) it is far from obvious whether a viable computable alternative exists.’114 The
reason is that these theories involve the notion of a continuum (for instance, the space-
time continuum), which is precluded by CUH. The continuum should be banished from
all physical theories in order for CUH to be plausible – but that seems to be unfeasible.
I conclude that MUH has quite some troubles in accounting for effectiveness of type
(ii), since it cannot explain that the world structure is sufficiently simple to allow for
substantial human investigation.115
4.4.3 MUH’s implausibility
I will now present three problems for MUH which, as I will argue, together render MUH
implausible.
The first problem is that, arguably, MUH entails that our world structure is part of a
multiverse comprising all mathematical structures. This is for the following reason. It is
commonly thought that, if mathematical structures exist, they exist necessarily. Therefore,
relations are.) It is easily shown that the set of symmetries of a mathematical structure has a group structure; it
is called its symmetry group.
110[22, p. 116].
111[22, §7.6].
112[22, p. 131].
113Ibid.
114[22, p. 138].
115One might even argue that a sufficiently large symmetry group of the world structure is a necessary condi-
tion for effectiveness of type (i) as well. (The distinction between types (i) and (ii) is somewhat fluid.) In that
case MUH would also have problems in explaining effectiveness of type (i).
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if the world were a mathematical structure, it would exist necessarily. But if there were
one mathematical structure which existed necessarily (namely the world structure), it
would follow almost inevitably that all mathematical structures existed necessarily (why
would one of them have a priviliged status?). In short, when accepting MUH, one is
forced to agree with Tegmark that ’mathematical existence and physical existence are
equivalent, so that all mathematical structures have the same ontological status.’116 This
amounts to the idea of a multiverse, comprising all mathematical structures, one of which
happens to be ours – call this the Mathematical Multiverse Hypothesis (MMH).117
MMH seems to be a special form of David Lewis’s modal realism, which says that every
possible world, including the actual one, has the same ontological status; i.e. ’actual’ is an
indexical term, just like ’here’, ’now’ and ’I’. Most philosophers consider modal realism
bizarre and implausible. If MMH is indeed a special form of modal realism, however, it
is at least as implausible. Therefore, since MUH entails MMH, we have good reasons to
reject MUH.
Another problem for MUH is the following. Physicists typically distinguish between
laws of nature and initial conditions. The former are the ’rules’ according to which the
universe behaves, often expressed by mathematical formulas, the latter are, slightly over-
simplifying, the numbers we put into the formulas in order to compute certain quanti-
ties. However, if MUH were true, there would be no such things as initial conditions.118
Tegmark explains:
Whereas the traditional notion of initial conditions entails that our universe
“started out” in some particular state, mathematical structures do not exist in
an external space or time, are not created or destroyed, and in many cases
also lack any internal structure resembling time. Instead, the MUH leaves no
room for “initial conditions”, eliminating them altogether. This is because the
mathematical structure is by definition a complete description of the physical
world.119
However, this view goes against a broad consensus among theoretical physicists and
cosmologists that there is a clear distinction between laws of nature and initial conditions.
It is commonly thought, for instance, that, even presupposing the actual laws of nature,
physical constants, such as the speed of light and the gravitational constant, could have
been different. By banishing initial conditions from physics, we would end up with a
completely different physics. If the sharp distinction between laws of nature and initial
conditions were mistaken, it would be difficult to understand how contemporary physics
could be at the same time so successful and so deeply flawed. In short, the non-existence
of initial conditions, entailed by MUH, is implausible and goes against intuitions widely
held by physicists. This makes MUH significantly less plausible.
The final and perhaps most serious problem for MUH is that it amounts to a rather
extreme form of reductionism, which defies our everyday intuitions in many different
ways. If MUH were true, then all properties of all entities and events would be reducible
to mathematical properties. Mathematical structures are typically considered to be non-
spatial, non-temporal, non-material, causally inert, unmoral and unconscious. So, it is
very difficult to understand how the world structure could accommodate notions such
as space, time, matter, causality, morality and consciousness. These concepts would all have
to be reducible to mathematics, which is a staggering idea. The world would be vastly
different than we have always thought.
The question is justified whether we should be willing to pay the high price of ac-
cepting such a counterintuitive theory like MUH. What is more, if the world differed so
116[22, p. 125], italics in the original.
117Notice that someone who rejects MUH and thinks the universe is contingent cannot give a similar argument
for the existence of a multiverse.
118See [22, §4.2].
119[22, p. 117], italics in the original.
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greatly from our common sense views, why should we accept the reliability of human
cognitive faculties in the first place? On the contrary, if the ideas produced by our ratio-
nal intuitions and everyday perceptions differed so wildly from the world’s real nature,
we would have good reasons to doubt the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties and
everything produced by them, including MUH itself. Hence, a good case can be made that
MUH is self-defeating.120
I conclude that, not only does MUH face serious troubles in accounting for effec-
tiveness of type (ii) (see § 4.4.2), but also MUH is itself implausible for various reasons.
Hence, MUH cannot be properly used for explaining the effectiveness of mathematics.
4.5 Why naturalist explanations fail in general
In the previous four subsections I have discussed several naturalist responses to the ef-
fectiveness of mathematics. As I have tried to show, they do not ’solve’ the problem in
a satisfactory manner. I will now argue that naturalism fails in general to adequately ac-
count for the effectiveness of mathematics. The discussion below will take the following
form: naturalism cannot adequately account for effectiveness of type (i) (§ 4.5.1), nor for
effectiveness of type (ii), even if effectiveness of type (i) would be taken for granted (§ 4.5.2),
nor for effectiveness of type (iii), even if effectiveness of types (i) and (ii) would be taken for
granted (§ 4.5.3). It should be emphasized that I will not merely argue that, on natural-
ism, the types (i)-(iii) of effectiveness are unexplained – leaving room for the possibility
that one day an adequate naturalist explanation will be found – but rather that they are
unexplainable: an adequate naturalist explanation cannot be found.
4.5.1 Effectiveness of type (i)
I will now argue that naturalism cannot adequately account for effectiveness of type
(i): the mathematical describability of the world. In § 3.1, two necessary conditions for
this were discussed: sufficient regularity of the world and the mechanistic nature of this
regularity.
Assuming naturalism, why would the world satisfy these two conditions for math-
ematical describability? My claim is that there is no satisfying answer to this question.
First of all, on naturalism there seems to be no reason why our world would not be like
the chaotic world of § 3.1.1.121 (Arguably, Tegmark’s MUH, if plausible, would be able
to explain why we do not live in a chaotic world. However, as we have seen, MUH is
too problematic.) Indeed, at least prima facie, there is nothing contradictory about such a
world; surely, someone who denies the possibility of a chaotic world carries the burden
of proof here. Now, if one accepts that chaotic worlds are possible, it is hard to deny that
the great majority of possible worlds is chaotic. It is reasonable to say – at least for the
naturalist – that, just like most sequences of dice rolls have no interesting pattern and
most arrangements of musical notes do not form a pleasant piece of music, most possible
worlds are chaotic.122 The naturalist lacks the explanatory resources to account for the
remarkable fact that, nevertheless, we happen to live in a non-chaotic world. Indeed, a
naturalist explanation of any phenomenon almost inevitably presupposes the orderly na-
ture of the world, since the naturalist can only provide explanations in terms of natural
entities and phenomena. However, this means that the orderly nature of the world itself
cannot be adequately explained on naturalism.123
120This way of reasoning resembles Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, first proposed in
[17, §12]. Plantinga aims to show that the conjunction of evolution and naturalism undermines the reliability
of our cognitive faculties, which provides us with a defeater for the conjunction of evolution and naturalism.
Like Plantinga has argued that the conjunction of evolution and naturalism is self-defeating, I argue that MUH
is self-defeating.
121The response that the world’s orderly behavior is due to the laws of nature is obviously besides the point:
laws of nature describe the world’s regular behavior, but do not explain it.
122Here we use the assumption that the world’s orderly structure is an objective (i.e. observer-independent)
feature of the world. Naturalism, according to our definition, is committed to this view.
123This can also be formulated as an argument by analogy as follows (cf. [20] by Swinburne). In all cases in
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Obviously, the naturalist could invoke some sort of anthropic principle, claiming that
among the possible worlds with intelligent observers the non-chaotic worlds do prevail. How-
ever, this response is problematic for several reasons. First, anthropic principles can only
be used in explanations if one assumes the existence of a multiverse, which is rather
speculative and ad hoc. More importantly, however, it is not clear at all that non-chaotic
universes prevail among possible worlds with intelligent observers. For consider a pos-
sible world W inhabited by an intelligent observer S. Presumably, S has some sort of
orderly nature. But why think this is also true for the rest of W? In general, if X1 is
a proper part of X2 and X1 is ordered in some way, we cannot conclude that its com-
plement in X2 also has this (or another) ordering. One could object: should W not be
sufficiently ordered in order to ’bring about’ or ’accommodate’ S’s existence? I see no
obvious reason, however, why this would be so. (Maybe, intelligent observers can just
pop into existence in chaotic worlds.) In any case, it cannot be simply assumed that the
orderly nature of S makes the orderly nature of W probable; one has to argue for that. In
short, the invocation of an anthropic principle in order to explain the orderly nature of
the world does not seem to be successful.
Both the need for a naturalist explanation of the world’s orderly nature and the dif-
ficulty of giving one are supported by the persistent toughness of Hume’s problem of
induction. What grounds predictions of unobserved events based on observed events? If
the orderly nature of the world could be explained in a satisfactory way, this would con-
tribute significantly to a solution of Hume’s problem: extrapolations from the observed to
the unobserved would be justified precisely because of the world’s orderly nature. Therefore,
the many philosophers regarding Hume’s problem of induction to be largely unsolved
(or even insoluble)124 implicitly endorse the mysteriousness of the world’s orderly nature.
Even if we grant the naturalist that the world has an orderly nature, she still has to ex-
plain why this nature is not of the Aristotelian-teleological kind. The same troubles arise
here: one can easily think of non-chaotic possible worlds that lack the mechanistic struc-
ture required for mathematical describability. In fact, as we saw in § 3.1.2, pre-modern
Europe has thought for centuries that the actual world was of this kind. Therefore, the
mechanistic nature of the world cannot be taken for granted, just like its orderly nature
per se.
Summarizing, the essence of the problem for naturalism in accounting for the regu-
larity of the world’s behavior and its mechanistic nature, is that naturalist explanations
do not come off the ground without presupposing these two features of reality. Indeed,
naturalist explanations depend on the orderly behavior and interrelations of certain nat-
ural entities. Therefore, naturalism cannot explain the two features, though at the same
time, they cannot be taken for granted. Since both features are necessary for adequate
mathematical description, we conclude that, on naturalism, the world’s mathematical
describability cannot be properly explained.
4.5.2 Effectiveness of type (ii)
Let us now, for the sake of argument, take effectiveness of type (i) for granted. I will argue
that, even then, naturalism is unable to adequately account for effectiveness of type (ii). In
§ 3.2 I have discussed two remarkable aspects of the fact that the world is mathematically
describable by human beings: first, the matching between the world’s complexity level
and human cognitive faculties, and, second, our possession of these cognitive faculties
per se. I will discuss these two aspects in turn.
which X is ordered and we understand how this order has come about, X’s orderly nature is explained by
something external to X. (For instance, sand patterns on the beach are explained by external factors such as
wind, water and playing children.) Therefore, by taking X to be the universe, it is reasonable to think that an
explanation of the orderly nature of the universe involves reference to factors external to the universe. However,
explanations of this kind are not available to the naturalist.
124Henderson, in [11], notices: ’A number of philosophers have attempted solutions to the problem [of induc-
tion], but a significant number have embraced [Hume’s] conclusion that it is insoluble.’
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Recall that there is a remarkable matching between the world’s complexity level and
human cognitive faculties: on the one hand, we are able to comprehend the physical
world quite well in an objective sense (as we saw in § 3.2.1, the ’relativity objection’ has
only limited force); on the other hand, uncovering the world’s structure remains a very
challenging business. When it comes to accounting for this matching, the problem for
naturalism is the following: the matching suggests that human beings somehow take a
special place in the observable world, whereas this suggestion is at odds with natural-
ism. Indeed, on naturalism, human beings can be fully explained in terms of natural
phenomena – more specifically: in terms of their evolutionary development, perhaps
combined with cultural influences. Furthermore, on naturalism, the world’s structure
is an observer-independent feature; in particular, the world’s complexity level does not
depend on human factors. This means that a naturalist explanation cannot involve the
idea that human beings are ’special’ in the entirety of the observed universe. However,
an adequate explanation of the matching between the world’s complexity level and hu-
man cognitive faculties almost inevitably must involve this idea. Indeed, the matching
is beyond the scope of explanations by the historical developments of mathematics and
the natural sciences (cf. § 4.2) and evolutionary explanations (cf. § 4.3).125 Furthermore,
Tegmark’s MUH also fails in providing an adequate explanation (cf. § 4.4). In conclusion,
naturalism lacks the explanatory resources for accounting for the remarkable matching.
Let us turn to the second aspect of the world’s mathematical describability by hu-
man beings: our possession of advanced mathematical faculties. Arguably, the naturalist
has only one explanatory tool available: the unguided process of Darwinian evolution.
However, it is highly problematic to give such an explanation, as was illustrated by De
Cruz’s attempt, discussed in § 4.3. The crucial point is the following: the difference in
level of sophistication between elementary mathematical faculties – which can be argued
to be survival-enhancing – and the advanced mathematical faculties – which are clearly
not survival-enhancing – is enormous. Therefore, its seems to be impossible to give a
reasonable evolutionary explanation for the advanced mathematical faculties possessed
by human beings. Since evolutionary explanations are the only explanations available to
the naturalist, we may conclude that naturalism is unable to adequately account for our
advanced mathematical faculties.
In short, I have argued that the following two features are unexplainable when as-
suming naturalism: the matching between nature’s complexity level and human cogni-
tive faculties (§ 3.2.1), and the possession of advanced mathematical faculties by human
beings (§ 3.2.2). I conclude that the world’s mathematical describability by human beings
cannot be properly explained when assuming naturalism.
4.5.3 Effectiveness of type (iii)
Finally, I will argue that, even when the world’s mathematical describability per se and its
mathematical describability by human beings are taken for granted, the remarkably fruitful
way in which mathematics is used in the natural sciences cannot adequately be accounted
for when assuming naturalism.
We have seen in § 3.3 how there is a remarkable correspondence between the ’anthro-
pocentric’ notion of mathematical beauty and the ’objective’ notion of empirical adequacy,
which is fruitfully exploited by scientists. An especially salient example of this anthro-
pocentric approach is the fruitful employment of Pythagorean and formalist analogies in
physics. An adequate account of the fruitfulness of the anthropocentric approach in the
natural sciences should somehow explain how ’local’ human preferences have ’global’
relevance: human taste for mathematical beauty is somehow conducive to giving empir-
ically adequate descriptions of the external world.
However, this is problematic for the naturalist roughly for the same reasons as why
125Even if an evolutionary explanation could be given of human mathematical faculties per se, this would not
be sufficient to account for the matching between the complexity level of the world and these faculties.
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explaining effectiveness of type (ii) is: the fruitfulness of anthropocentric approaches in
the natural sciences suggests that humans are somehow special, which naturalism cannot
accept. Of course, one could consider a Darwinian explanation along the following lines:
perhaps the human brain has developed subtle preferences for mathematical structures
that somehow ’resemble’ reality, since such preferences cause more adaptive behavior.
However, this kind of explanation runs into the same troubles as discussed before: how
could the environment of a primitive hunter-gatherer society contribute to the ’right’
sense of mathematical beauty, now fruitfully employed by theoretical physicists?
Furthermore, as we have seen in § 4.2, Pythagorean and formalist analogies are de-
fined in such a way that their fruitful usage is hardly susceptible to proper explanations
by means of the simultaneous developments of mathematics and the natural sciences.
(Recall that this is because, by their very nature, Pythagorean and formalist analogies
have no known physical basis.)
I conclude that the fruitful way in which mathematics is used in the natural sciences
cannot adequately be accounted for when assuming naturalism.
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5 Naturalism in trouble
We have seen that naturalism cannot adequately account for the effectiveness of mathe-
matics. In order to judge how serious the consequences for naturalism are, we should also
consider how non-naturalist views fare in explaining the effectiveness of mathematics. If,
for instance, there were no satisfying non-naturalist explanations either, then naturalism
would not be seriously challenged by its failure in this respect. As I will argue in § 5.1,
however, adequate non-naturalist explanations are available. In § 5.2 I will conclude that,
because of the failure of naturalism to account for the effectiveness of mathematics and
the availability of non-naturalist explanations, naturalism is probably false.
5.1 The existence of viable non-naturalist explanations
Let us consider two examples of non-naturalist explanations of the effectiveness of math-
ematics. I will discuss transcendental idealism and theism, and argue that they are, at least
prima facie, perfectly capable of accounting for the effectiveness of mathematics.
According to Kant’s transcendental idealism, the world’s mathematical structure only
pertains to the phenomenal world and not to the noumenal world: it is just the struc-
ture ’added’ by an observing subject to the unordered flow of empirical stimuli; hence,
there is no observer-independent mathematical structure in need of an explanation. This
explains (or, actually, dissolves) effectiveness of type (i). Moreover, since the world’s struc-
ture originates from the human mind, the matching between its complexity level and
human cognitive faculties is not that surprising. Perhaps the transcendental idealist has
to do some more work to explain the existence of advanced mathematical human abil-
ities per se, but at least she has more explanatory resources than the naturalist, who is
forced to give a ’bottom-up’ Darwinian explanation. In short, transcendental idealism
can reasonably well account for effectiveness of type (ii) as well. Finally, let us consider
effectiveness of type (iii), which centers around the observation that profoundly anthro-
pocentric approaches in the natural sciences are remarkably fruitful. This too fits well
with transcendental idealism: since we ourselves supply the phenomenal world with a
mathematical structure, the world’s order is essentially human; so, it is no surprise that
anthropocentric investigation methods work so well.
Let us turn to theism.126 A theist can say that the world is structured mathematically
by God. He did so in such a way that the world would be intelligible and analyzable
for human observers, not only by giving it a causal structure, but also by adjusting its
complexity level and human cognitive faculties to each other. Furthermore, a theist will
typically deny that human cognitive faculties have come about by an unguided process;
instead, these faculties are viewed as part of God’s design. The foregoing provides an
explanation of effectiveness of types (i) and (ii). When it comes to explaining effectiveness
of type (iii), the theist’s answer is obvious: an anthropocentric approach in investigating
the world is no more than reasonable, since humans take a central place in the universe,
given to them by God. For instance, according to the Judeo-Christian doctrine of Imago
Dei, God created man in his own image. In Genesis 1: 26-28,127 the main source for this
doctrine, the notion of Imago Dei is connected to man’s exploration of and dominion over
the earth. By accepting this doctrine, it becomes immediately clear why an anthropocen-
tric approach in the natural sciences is so effective: God has adjusted humans and their
126I define theism as the view that there exists one God, who has created the universe, with mankind having
been given a special place in it. In particular, God is assumed to be external to the universe.
127In the NIV this reads:
Then God said, "Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness, so that they may rule over
the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals, and over
all the creatures that move along the ground." So God created mankind in his own image, in the
image of God he created them; male and female he created them. God blessed them and said to
them, "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the
sea and the birds in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground."
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environment to each other in such a way that they could explore it and make fruitful use
of it.
In short, both transcendental idealism and theism are, at least prima facie, perfectly able
to account for the effectiveness of mathematics. Notice that, in both cases, they explain
the three types of effectiveness by providing one coherent story, whereas alleged naturalist
explanations are typically piecemeal responses to each of the three types. Therefore, the
explanations provided by transcendental idealism and theism outrival naturalist expla-
nations in explanatory power and explanatory scope. Furthermore, both non-naturalist
explanations are not ad hoc: the views of transcendental idealism and theism are able to
accommodate the effectiveness of mathematics in a plain fashion, by just appealing to
characteristics specific to their own view.
5.2 The unreasonableness of embracing Wigner’s mystery
In § 4 I have argued that naturalism cannot adequately account for the effectiveness of
mathematics. Naturalism lacks the explanatory resources for accounting for the three
types of effectiveness separately – let alone for explaining them by one overarching co-
herent story. We have also seen, in § 5.1, that two non-naturalist theories can provide such
an account. Moreover, both of them do so by telling one coherent story which is not ad
hoc and explains the three types of effectiveness all at once. This puts a challenge to natu-
ralism: it fails in accounting for the effectiveness of mathematics, while two rival theories
seem to fare much better in doing so. The fact that the two non-naturalist explanations
discussed are so divergent, does not undermine this challenge: it just shows that, if only
one is willing to reject naturalism, various solutions come available to solve the problem.
If anything, this makes the troubles for naturalism yet more serious.
What makes matters even worse for naturalism is that the phenomenon it fails to ex-
plain lies in the core of its area of interest, namely the natural sciences. Indeed, it is rather
unpalatable for naturalism, with its high expectations of the natural sciences in general
and physics in particular, that it is not able to explain the effectiveness of mathematics
in these very disciplines. The naturalist, who cannot properly explain the effectiveness of
mathematics, is forced to accept that mathematical tools, of crucial importance for the
natural sciences, are of incomprehensible utility. This means that, for the naturalist, the
mystery of the effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences extends to a mystery
of the effectiveness of the natural sciences themselves. The impressive technical develop-
ments since the Scientific Revolution would be surrounded by mystery as well, since they
depend on theories in the natural sciences, the effectiveness of which is mysterious. Ac-
cepting so much mysteriousness is hardly tenable for the naturalist – yet seems inevitable
if the effectiveness of mathematics cannot be adequately accounted for.
There is one extra consideration in favor of the rejection of naturalism in light of the
effectiveness of mathematics. It is well agreed upon by historians of science that the con-
temporary natural sciences, in which mathematics plays such an essential role, originate
in the ’marriage’ between natural philosophy and mathematics during the Scientific Rev-
olution.128 As a matter of fact, this marriage was motivated by non-naturalist – more
specific: Christian theist – ideas. Johannes Kepler, for instance, justifies the mathematical
approach in his Mysterium Cosmographicum as follows:
I shall have the physicists [i.e. the natural philosophers] against me in these
chapters, because I have deduced the natural properties of the planets from
immaterial things and mathematical figures. (. . . ) I wish to respond briefly
as follows: that God the Creator, since he is a mind, and does what he wants,
is not prohibited, in attributing powers and appointing circles, from having
regard to things which are either immaterial or based on imagination.129
128Cf. § 3.1.2 and [10].
129Cited in [10, p. 19]. The fact that Kepler’s ’exotic’ views about our solar system, expressed in his Mysterium
Cosmographicum, look somewhat ridiculous for contemporary readers, does not undermine my main point: the
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Another example is the well-known statement by Galileo Galilei that God has written the
book of nature in the language of mathematics. Harrison describes Galileo’s motivation
for using mathematics in natural philosophy as follows:
Mathematics, in short, was appropriate in discussions of nature because God
had imbued the universe with a mathematical order. Human beings can intuit
this order insofar as they participate in the mathematical truths that inhabit
the mind of God.130
In the centuries following the Scientific Revolution, more and more sophisticated mathe-
matical tools were employed in the natural sciences, while, at the same time, the original
theological motivation for using mathematics more and more faded away. Now, this is
the crucial point: while the effectiveness of mathematics was expected rather than seen
as a mystery by the founders of modern science, it became cut off from its original ex-
planatory resources by the embracement of naturalism, and nowadays poses a great ex-
planatory challenge.131 Obviously, it is possible that the effectiveness of something is due
to something else than previously thought. However, if a new theory cannot account
for something which previously seemed to be well explained, some suspicion towards
this theory – in our case: naturalism – is clearly justified. So, in light of these historical
considerations the case for naturalism is even more troublesome.
Summarizing, naturalism finds itself in the following predicament. It fails in explain-
ing the effectiveness of mathematics, while at least two different promising non-naturalist
explanations are available. This is all the more troubling for naturalism since what it fails
to explain is situated in the core of its area of interest, namely the natural sciences. What
makes the case for naturalism still worse is that its failure to account for the effective-
ness of mathematics is a deterioration, historically speaking. All in all, naturalism cannot
reasonably embrace ’Wigner’s mystery’ – this is also supported by the many different
attempts to propose naturalist explanations (cf. § 4) – but, at the same time, fails to solve
the mystery. Therefore, naturalism is probably false.
original use of mathematics in natural philosophy was theologically motivated.
130[10, pp. 19-20].
131Cf. [10, p. 30], where Harrison discusses some consequences of the fact that the notion of laws of nature has
been loosened from its original theological motivations.
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6 Conclusion
Let us summarize the argument and make some final remarks. In § 3 I have examined
the effectiveness of mathematics, distinguishing between three different types of it. In
§ 4 I have argued that naturalism is unable to adequately account for these three types of
effectiveness. Finally, I have argued that, since naturalism lacks the explanatory resources
for accounting for the effectiveness of mathematics whereas some non-naturalist theories
do have these resources (§ 5.1), we have good reasons to reject naturalism (§ 5.2).
Obviously, the convincingness of my argument depends on one’s a priori attitude to-
wards naturalism. Someone already doubting naturalism might find my argument strong
enough to reject naturalism at once, whereas someone strongly convinced of naturalism
might only become somewhat less convinced of her position.
In any case, the argument shows that the success of the natural sciences, intimately
connected with the role played by mathematics in them, does not go together with natu-
ralism as easily as one might be inclined to think. On the contrary, the more the natural
sciences can explain of the physical world, the more mysterious the effectiveness of math-
ematics is, and the more troubles naturalism has in accounting for this effectiveness. In
short, the more successful the natural sciences are, the greater the challenge for natural-
ism is. All in all, naturalism – according to the definition in this thesis – does not provide
the solid basis for the natural sciences tacitly assumed by many.
In further research into this topic, one might consider other forms of naturalism.
Are there any versions of naturalism which do allow for an adequate explanation of the
effectiveness of mathematics? Furthermore, it would be worth considering non-naturalist
explanations. How can transcendental idealist and theist explanations be developed in
more detail? Clearly, there is still much work to be done.
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